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TRUSTS
BREACH OF TRUST BY TRUSTEE

Arkansas. Hardy v. Hardy' was an action by a beneficiary of
a trust to require the trustee to restore to the trust estate certain
funds. The testator had provided for a testamentary trust in favor
of three minor children, and his widow, the defendant, was to act
as trustee. The testator's estate included certain timber lands; the
will directed that his widow was to receive a life estate in onethird of the timber lands with the other two-thirds and remainder
after the widow's life estate to be included in the trust corpus. As
timber was sold, the trustee set aside one-third of the proceeds
from such sales, invested the same and paid the income from the
investment to herself, individually, but held the principal as an
asset of the trust. Each year the trustee filed a report in the
chancery court for the previous calendar year; these reports were
to continue during the life of the trust; and each report was
approved by the court, including those for the years 1945 and
1946.
Up to this point the entire proceedings were regular. However,
in 1945 the Arkansas General Assembly passed Act No. 143,'
which provided that a widow's dower interest in timber should be
an absolute one-third of the proceeds of any sale. In spite of the
fact that the Pulaski County Chancery Court had rendered a decree
many years previously that defendant had elected to take under
the will and not by right of dower, the defendant for the years
1945 and 1946, upon the advice of counsel, took for herself
absolutely the full one-third of the proceeds of the timber sales.
It was for the return to the trust estate of this one-third of the
proceeds of the timber sales that the plaintiff sued. The trial court
held that the trustee acted in good faith and that the chancery
court orders approving the annual trustee reports for the years
1945 and 1946 were final and could not be set aside.
The supreme court reversed the trial court and held that Act
1...........Ark -------------230 S. W.

2d 6 (1950).

2 ARK. STAT. 1947 ANN. § 61-204.
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No. 143 of the 1945 Arkansas General Assembly had no effect
on this case, as defendant had accepted the chancery court decree
which had declared that defendant had abandoned her claim to
dower by having accepted benefits under the will. In addition, the
supreme court held that the act of the defendant in taking for
her own personal use one-third of the timber sales in 1945 and
1946 was a breach of trust..The court stated that this was true in
spite of the fact that the trustee acted in good faith in thinking
that Act No. 143 legally entitled her to one-third of the proceeds
of the timber sales. Finally, the supreme court held that the orders
of the chancery court approving the accounts of the trustee each
year were only interlocutory and did not become final until the
trust was terminated; therefore, they could be set aside in this
action.
This case properly applied the general rule that any act of a
trustee which results in his private gain and which was done
without the knowledge of the beneficiary is a breach of trust.'
The breach is not mitigated by good faith or because of reliance
upon advice of counsel.4 The harshness of this rule may be avoided
by submitting the matter to the court for instructions.
Arkansas is among the minority of states in holding that an
intermediate accounting by a trustee is not res judicata as to
matters included in the accounting.6 However, because of the duty
of the trustee not to do anything for his own personal benefit, any
act which does result in personal gain to the trustee will likely be
held to be "constructive fraud," even in the absence of actual
fraudulent intent; therefore, had the court followed the majority
rule by holding that the annual reports of the trustee were final,
they probably could have been set aside on the ground of "constructive fraud". 7
A companion case to the case just discussed is Hardy v. Hardy'
3 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) §§ 492, 543; 2 Scow, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
(1939) § 201.
4 Ibid.
5 2 ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS (1939) § 201.
6 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 973.
8

3 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 493.
Ark
__, 230 S. W. 2d 11 (1950).
--
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in which the trustee and a beneficiary had agreed on a valuation
date for the purpose of determining the beneficiary's final interest
in the trust. An appraiser set the value of certain stocks at
$20,834.60 as of the agreed date. The trustee paid the beneficiary
on the basis of this valuation; however, in the interim between
the date of valuation and the date of payment dividends on said
stock were received in the amount of $9,869.64. Although the
trustee had agreed to pay the beneficiary his pro-rata share of any
dividends received during this period, she failed to do so on the
ground that the agreed valuation date was the termination date
of this beneficiary's interest in the trust.
The court properly found that the trustee had breached her
trust. The general rule was applied that a fiduciary in dealing
with his principal must conduct himself in utmost good faith. 9
The fact that the trustee did not personally benefit from the act
was not material because when there are two or more beneficiaries,
the trustee is under a duty to deal with them in an impartial
0
manner.'
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS

Arkansas. In Jones v. Gachot" the question involved was
whether or not the necessary elements were present to impress a
constructive trust upon certain real estate. The property in question
was granted by Mrs. Felice Field by warranty deed to her two
nephews, L. C. Gachot and J. F. Gachot; it was alleged that there
was an oral agreement that they were to hold the property as
trustees for themselves and their brothers and sisters. The trial
court rejected the evidence as to the alleged trust agreement and
dismissed the case for want of equity.
On appeal plaintiffs conceded that an express trust cannot be
established by oral evidence.' 2 But they contended that a constructive trust should be imposed, basing their argument on the
doctrine stated in the Restatement of the Law of Trusts:
9 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 493.
10 1 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 183.
11 --...-.---Ark -----------,230 S. W. 2d 937 (1950).
12 ARK. STAT. 1947 ANN. § 38-106.
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"Where the owner of an interest in land transfers it inter vivos
to another in trust for a third person, but no memorandum
properly evidencing the intention to create a trust is signed, and
the transferee refuses to perform the trust, the transferee holds
the interest upon a constructive trust for the third person, if, but
only if,
(a) the transferee by fraud, duress or undue influence
prevented the transferor from creating an enforceable
interest in the third person, or
(b) the transferee at the time of the transfer was in a confidential relation to the transferor, or
(c) the transfer was made by the transferor in contemplation of death."18
The plaintiffs conceded that subsection (a) did not apply, but
they did contend that either subsection (b) or subsection (c) was
applicable. The reported evidence on these points was meager,
and the supreme court held that there was insufficient evidence to
justify the application of either subsection. The court expressly
refrained from holding that subsection (b) or subsection (c)
would have been applied had the evidence been sufficient; however,
the inference from the majority opinion and the direct statement
of the separate concurring opinion were that these subsections
would be applied in a proper situation. However, as recently as
1947 this court refused to apply subsection (b) in a situation
involving brothers and sisters in what appeared to be a very close,
confidential relation. 4
The principal case indicates that the Arkansas court is reluctant to impress constructive trusts on real estate on the basis
of oral evidence in the absence of fraud, duress or undue influence.
Cy Pres DOCTRINE
New Mexico. Gunderson v. Sage 5 was a suit to construe the
terms of a trust and for determination of the beneficiaries. The
13 1 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 45.
14 Hawkins v. Scanlon, 212 Ark. 180, 206 S. W. 2d 179 (1947) ; see Smith, A Dec-

ade in the Law of Trusts, 3 Ark. L. Rev. 3 (1948-49).
15 54 N. M. 347, 225 P. 2d 136 (1950).
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trial court found that the trust fund in question was raised by
the citizens of West Valencia County and McKinley County for
the primary purpose of sending aid to soldiers of those two
counties who were Japanese prisoners of war; that a secondary
purpose was to distribute the fund among the returning veterans of
those two counties who had been Japanese prisoners of war; and
that the exigencies of war prevented the primary purpose from
being accomplished. The judgment was affirmed by the, supreme
court.
The Bataan Veterans Association, an intervenor, contended that
there was only the primary purpose and that as it had failed, the
doctrine of cy pres should be applied for the benefit of all returning veterans in the state of New Mexico who had been Japanese
prisoners of war. Under the cy pres doctrine when the primary
purpose of a charitable trust fails, the court may look to the
general charitable intent of the settlor, and if a general charitable
intent is found, then the purpose of the trust may be changed to
conform as nearly as possible to the original intent of the settlor."6
Although in this case the court did not apply the cy pres doctrine because a secondary purpose was found to exist, the situation
was a proper one for the application of the doctrine had the
secondary purpose of the trust not been established. The court
might have held that the fund should be distributed among all
returning veterans of the state who had been Japanese prisoners
of war, or it could have been confined to such veterans as returned
to the two counties which raised the fund.
As it was, the court properly found that the trust fund should
be distributed according to the secondary purpose of the settlors.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Oklahoma. Turner v. Turner"7 was an action by the administratrix of the estate of J. D. Turner to quiet title to 140 acres of
land which J. D. Turner and seven of his brothers and sisters had
inherited. In order to refinance an indebtedness on this land J. D.
162 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 436; 3 ScOn, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
(1939) § 399.
17
- -Okla..
, 223 P. 2d 536 (1950).
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Turner represented to two sisters, Nina Turner and Zelma Stamper,
an incompetent, that if they would quitclaim to him their entire
interest in the land he would later convey to them the mineral
rights included in their quitclaim deeds to him. The trial court
rendered judgment in favor of Zelma Stamper, the incompetent,
but rendered judgment against the other sister, Nina Turner.
The supreme court reversed the judgment as to Nina Turner
on the ground that it was clearly against the weight of the evidence,
which had established that J. D. Turner held a one-eighth mineral
interest in the land in trust for Nina Turner. The fifteen-year
statute of limitations, i" governing actions to recover realty, rather
than the two-year statute,19 governing actions based on fraud, was
held to apply to Nina Turner's claim for recovery of such interest.
The principal question involved was whether the fifteen-year or
two-year statute of limitation should be applied to an action such
as this. There is little general authority on the subject, the result
depending upon a careful study of the wording and interpretations
of particular statutes.20 The authority cited by the supreme court
in the principal case was the earlier Oklahoma case of Dillon v.
Helm,21 which under a similar set of facts held that the fifteen-year
statute of limitations applied. According to that case the test as
to which statute is applicable is whether the allegation and proof
of fraud is a necessary element of the cause of action. If so, then
the two-year statute is applicable; if not, then the fifteen-year
statute is applicable. In the instant case Nina Turner was claiming
an equitable interest in the land-created by agreement-and
fraud was not an element in the case calling into operation the twoyear statute of limitations.

Scott McDonald.

18 12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Perm. Ed.) § 93.
19 12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Perm. Ed.) § 95.
20 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 953.
21 196 Okla. 140, 163 P. 2d 539 (1945).

